Critical edition of treatise on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy with commentary.

Papers presented at the National Seminar on Joina Logic and Epistemology held at the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona from 27th to 29th March 1995.

Contributed research papers presented at the National Seminar on Relations in Indian Philosophy, held during 25th-27th March 1991 at the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona.

It is often argued that the indispensability of continuum models comes from their empirical adequacy despite their decoupling from the microscopic details of the modelled physical system. There is thus a commonly held misconception that temperature varying across a region of space or time can always be accurately represented as a continuous function. We discuss three inter-related cases of temperature modelling — in phase transitions, thermal boundary resistance and slip flows — and show that the continuum view is fallacious on (...) the ground that the microscopic details of a physical system are not necessarily decoupled from continuum models. We show how temperature discontinuities are present in both data (experiments and simulations) and phenomena (theory and models) and how discontinuum models of temperature variation may have greater empirical adequacy and explanatory power. The conclusions of our paper are: a) continuum idealisations are not indispensable to modelling physical phenomena and both continuous and discontinuous representations of phenomena work depending on the context; b) temperature is not necessarily a continuously defined function in our best scientific representations of the world; and c) that its continuity, where applicable, is a contingent matter. We also raise a question as to whether discontinuous representations should be considered truly de-idealised descriptions of physical phenomena. (shrink)

The essays in this volume bring to their focuses on philosophical issues the new angles of vision created by the multicultural, global, and postcolonial feminisms that have been developing around us.

Many feminists of color have demonstrated the need to take into account differences among women to avoid hegemonic gender-essentialist analyses that represent the problems and interests of privileged women as paradigmatic. As feminist agendas become global, there is growing feminist concern to consider national and cultural differences among women. However, in attempting to take seriously these cultural differences, many feminists risk replacing gender-essentialist analyses with culturally essentialist analyses that replicate problematic colonialist notions about the cultural differences between "Western culture" and (...) "non-Western cultures" and the women who inhabit them (Narayan 1998). Seemingly universal essentialist generalizations about "all women" are replaced by culture-specific essentialist generalizations that depend on totalizing categories such as "Western culture,' "non-Western cultures," "Indian women," and "Muslim women." The picture of the "cultures" attributed to these groups of women remains fundamentally essentialist, depicting as homogeneous groups of heterogeneous peoples whose values, ways of life, and political commitments are internally diverge. (shrink)

So-called ‘distinctively mathematical explanations’ (DMEs) are said to explain physical phenomena, not in terms of contingent causal laws, but rather in terms of mathematical necessities that constrain the physical system in question. Lange argues that the existence of four or more equilibrium positions of any double pendulum has a DME. Here we refute both Lange’s claim itself and a strengthened and extended version of the claim that would pertain to any n-tuple pendulum system on the ground that such explanations are (...) actually causal explanations in disguise and their associated modal conditionals are not general enough to explain the said features of such dynamical systems. We argue and show that if circumscribing the antecedent for a necessarily true conditional in such explanations involves making a causal analysis of the problem, then the resulting explanation is not distinctively mathematical or non-causal. Our argument generalises to other dynamical systems that may have purported DMEs analogous to the one proposed by Lange, and even to some other counterfactual accounts of non-causal explanation given by Reutlinger and Rice. (shrink)

Exposition of Guḍārthatattvāloka of Dharmadatta Jhā, 1860-1918, commentary on the Siddhāntalakṣaṇa of Jagadīśatarkālaṅkāra, work on the basic tenets of the Nyaya school in Hindu philosophy.

As the term "family values" achieves prominence in the rhetoric of political debate, the social issues at the heart of today's political controversies deserve to be studied in depth. This volume brings together a group of philosophers, political scientists, and legal scholars to explore a wide range of specific topics dealing with the legal, ethical, and political dimensions of familial relationships. Topics addressed include the rights of unwed fathers, the nature of children's autonomy, children's rights to divorce their parents, parental (...) rights with respect to medical treatment and religious education of children, surrogate parenting, same-sex parenting, and single-parent families. Collectively, the essays point out that many contemporary issues pertaining to the having and raising of children pose genuinely hard choices for public policy makers, for those who make and enforce the laws, and for citizens who would like to engage in informed and critical democratic debate on these issues. (shrink)

On the sāṅkhya and yoga systems of Indian philosophy as interpreted by Vijñānabhikṣu, fl. 1545-1550, in his Sāṅkhyapravac̣anabhāṣya and Yogavārttika.

On the life and works of Maṇḍanamiśra, philosopher of Saṅkarācārya tradition.

YO GA-DARSHAN A Sfitras of Patafijali with Bhaisya ofVy:1sa BY Ganganatha Jha he Yoga-darshana includes the Yoga-sfitras ofPataf1jali, and the ancient commentary thereon by Vyasa. The Yoga-sfitras of Patafijali are the classic?...

Uma Narayan attempts to clarify what the feminist notion of the 'epistemic privilege of the oppressed' does and does not imply. She argues that the fact that oppressed 'insiders' have epistemic privilege regarding their oppression creates problems in dialogue with and coalitionary politics involving 'outsiders' who do not share the oppression, since the latter fail to come to terms with the epistemic privilege of the insiders. She concretely analyzes different ways in which the emotions of insiders can be inadvertantly (...) hurt by outsiders and suggests ways in which such problems can be minimized. (shrink)

Drawing parallels between gender essentialism and cultural essentialism, I point to some common features of essentialist pictures of culture. I argue that cultural essentialism is detrimental to feminist agendas and suggest strategies for its avoidance. Contending that some forms of cultural relativism buy into essentialist notions of culture, I argue that postcolonial feminists need to be cautious about essentialist contrasts between "Western" and "Third World" cultures.

_Dislocating Cultures_ takes aim at the related notions of nation, identity, and tradition to show how Western and Third World scholars have misrepresented Third World cultures and feminist agendas. Drawing attention to the political forces that have spawned, shaped, and perpetuated these misrepresentations since colonial times, Uma Narayan inspects the underlying problems which "culture" poses for the respect of difference and cross-cultural understanding. Questioning the problematic roles assigned to Third World subjects within multiculturalism, Narayan examines ways in which (...) the flow of information across national contexts affects our understanding of issues. _Dislocating Cultures_ contributes a philosophical perspective on areas of ongoing interest such as nationalism, post-colonial studies, and the cultural politics of debates over tradition and "westernization" in Third World contexts. (shrink)

For the last two centuries the novel has been the predominant literary genre; but the generic identity of the novel is far from established. Attempts to define the novel have focussed on formal features of particular types of texts, with the result that definitions of “the” novel have merely canonized one or another of the innumerable novelistic manifestations—Bildungsroman, eighteenth-century English novels, novels of the kind George Eliot or Henry James or Marcel Proust or Feodor Dostoevsky wrote, etc. By basing themselves (...) upon such formal attributes, such definitions exclude a vast number of potential texts on essentially normative grounds. Further, the history of the novel has outgrown and contradicted those conceptions; no sooner than a theory has been formulated, the novel itself has moved forward, adapting to changing conditions and substituting for those formal properties a set of new ones, thus rendering the theories obsolete and revealing the inadequacy of formalist categories to define the genre. This predicament is certainly not unique to the theory of the novel but rather a necessary concomitant of any theoretical project; what makes any attempt to theorize about the novel particularly vulnerable is the genre's resistence to formalist analysis, its lack of precisely those organizing categories upon which a formalist theory of any genre can be built. (shrink)

My first chapter criticizes the prevalent understanding of offensive conduct as conduct that causes others mental distress and develops a normative view of offensive conduct as conduct that treats others without due consideration or respect. My second chapter examines the relationship between 'harm' and 'offense'. I analyze harm as a setback to an 'interest-as-claim' that reduces a person's resources or capacities to function. I argue that offensive conduct is sometimes a harm and sometimes not. ;My third chapter criticizes a majoritarian (...) 'empirical' approach to determining the relative seriousness of offensive conduct and sets out a 'normative' approach that involves judging whether people have 'good reasons' to take offense at a type of conduct. My fourth chapter examines the problems created by the role social conventions play in people's reasons for taking offense. I argue that such conventions can be morally evaluated by examining what interests of individuals they protect, and whether these interests warrant protection. Only when social conventions survive moral evaluation can they form part of a 'good reason' for taking offense. ;My fifth chapter criticizes the legal concept of a 'standard person' for inadequately considering 'non-standard interests'. I argue that 'nonstandard group interests' due to 'natural vulnerabilities' and to 'socially constructed vulnerabilities' should be routinely considered for protection under the Harm and Offense Principles. I argue that 'special cultural sensibilities' may be extended protection when special reasons are present. ;My last chapter argues that my analysis of offensive conduct narrows the kinds of conduct considered for legal protection compared to analyses such as Joel Feinberg's, and that this narrowing helps avoid the moral and political problems Feinberg's analysis creates. I argue that the compatibility of the Offense Principle with liberalism depends on the rationale one has for it and the scope one assigns it. I conclude that my understanding of offensive conduct, the rationale I have for the Offense Principle, and the limited scope I assign it, make my approach to offense more compatible with liberalism than Feinberg's approach. (shrink)

A reasoned argument or tarka is essential for a wholesome vāda that aims at establishing the truth. A strong tarka constitutes of a number of elements including an anumāna based on a valid hetu. Several scholars, such as Dharmakīrti, Vasubandhu and Dignāga, have worked on theories for the establishment of a valid hetu to distinguish it from an invalid one. This paper aims to interpret Dignāga’s hetu-cakra, called the wheel of grounds, from a modern philosophical perspective by deconstructing it into (...) a simple probabilistic mathematical model. The objective is to understand how and why a vāda based on a probabilistically weaker hetu can degrade into a Jalpa or vitaṇḍā. To do so, the paper maps the concept of ‘Bounded Rationality’ onto the hetu-cakra. Bounded Rationality, an idea coined by the management thinker Herbert Simon, is often employed in understanding decision-making processes of rational agents. In the context of this paper, the concept would state that the prativādin and ālocaka (debater) may not hold unbounded information to back their pratijñā (proposition). The paper argues that within the probabilistically deconstructed hetu-cakra model, most people argue in the ‘Zone of Bounded Rationality’, and thus, the probability of a debate degrading into Jalpa or vitaṇḍā is high. -/- . (shrink)

This article revisits the intellectual history of inequality in the thinking of Dr Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891–1956) and Dr Ram Manohar Lohia (1910–1967). Both were pivotal figures in the intellectual history of inequality in colonial and postcolonial India. Yet little work has been done to systematically juxtapose the two and their thinking on inequality. This article offers a first comparison, arguing that their ideas on inequality can be seen as the emergence of a unique, Indian version of what, in this (...) article, we term “organic intersectionality.” We build this argument on four claims. First, both were organic intellectuals whose thinking was molded in the marginalized groups from which they arose, but whose ideas developed in unique and organic ways. Second, both had a unique eye to the intersectional and holistic character of Indian inequality, cutting across caste, class, race, and gender. Third, their thinking grew from a deep engagement with religion, which they saw as both legitimizing and delegitimizing inequality. Fourth, both these figures exemplify postcolonial hybridity and thus stand in contrast both to a diffusionist approach whereby ideas are simply diffused from the West to the East, and to a nationalized, self-contained, or decolonial history of ideas. (shrink)

The chemist and philosopher Michael Polanyi was one of the first twentieth-century scientists to propose a program to resolve the internal conflict of the modern Enlightenment: scientific detachment and moral nihilism with humanist values. Stefania Jha’s intellectual biography places Polanyi in the context of his time and culture, analyzes his key philosophical ideas, and explicates the application—and at times misappropriation—of his work. Polanyi’s method was not laid out in his published works, and his vocabulary tends to make his writings difficult (...) to understand. By exposing the structure of his theory of tacit knowing, and by tracing the growth of his thinking, Jha shows how the various elements of his thought are integrated. Through examination of his philosophical roots in Kant and the complexity of his evolving thought, she counteracts the popular notion that Polanyi’s philosophy stands apart from the western philosophic tradition. Jha’s deep analysis makes Polanyi’s shift of focus from science to philosophy more intelligible, his philosophy more approachable, and the causes he championed—such as the freedom of science and cultural freedom—more understandable. Applying his notion of tacit knowing in practical directions, Jha seeks to bring the study of Polanyi’s philosophy out of the specialists’ enclave and into such fields as ethics and clinical medicine. (shrink)

Contributed articles on Indic philosophy, Vedic grammer, and classical Sanskrit literature; includes some on the life of Kr̥ṣṇa Mādho Jha, Sanskrit scholar.

Contributed research papers chiefly on various aspects of Indic philosophy, Vedic literature, etc.

Study of Tattvacintāmaṇididhiti of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, commentary on Pakṣatā, portion of Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa, dealing with the essential nature of proposition (pakṣatā), of Navya Nyāya school in Hindu philosophy.

Polanyi’s philosophy of “man in thought,” by all appearances, chronologically and structurally, seems to be founded on his epistemology. Polanyi’s epistemology of tacit knowing as integration is teleological. By his “ontological equation,” he patterned comprehensive (and complex) entities as emergence on his epistemology. This forces him to make puzzling formulaic statements which land him in trouble with fellow scientists. The equation also lends itself to unwarranted problematic interpretations. The exploration leads me to suggest that Polanyi may be understood as a (...) “rational realist” who insisted on a tacit knowledge version of interactionist mode of mind-body relation. (shrink)

I point to a colonial care discourse that enabled colonizers to define themselves in relationship to "inferior" colonized subjects. The colonized, however, had very different accounts of this relationship. While contemporary care discourse correctly insists on acknowledging human needs and relationships, it needs to worry about who defines these often contested terms. I conclude that improvements along dimensions of care and of justice often provide "enabling conditions" for each other.

On Maṇḍanamiśra, ancient Hindu philosopher of Sankaracarya tradition.

On the works and philosophy of Maṇḍanamiśra and Advaita Vedanta.